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THE ARMY VS. THE INDIANS VS. THE SETTLERS: The
South Florida Frontier Between the Seminole Wars
Dr. Joe Knetsch
One of the constant themes of Florida
frontier history is the continued threat of
violence. Either real or imagined, the threat
of a painful death at the hands of unknown
assailants, normally alleged to be Indians,
loomed in the background of every
settlement on the frontier. The acts of
providing settlers with ammunition,
weapons and constant patrols put the U.S.
Army in the middle of all potential
outbreaks. Therefore, any act, or reported
act, of violence by the remaining Indian
population had to be investigated, thwarted
or rebuffed, and the settlers reassured that
the incident was either false or isolated. The
Army’s predicament on the southern frontier
of Florida between the Second and Third
Seminole Wars becomes obvious with the
study of many of the remaining documents.
There was, to be sure, some violence caused
by Indians straying outside of the 1842
boundary, however, some of the violence
was not directly caused by this group but by
whites hoping to manipulate the Army into a
position of removing the remaining Indians,
by force if necessary.
The Armed Occupation Act of 1842, had not
yet passed when new settlers began arriving
in historic Manatee County. The most
notable group was the colony of Colonel
Samuel Reid, on the Manatee River. The
well-connected Reid recruited from his
fellow Middle-Floridians a colony of thirtytwo people (fifteen white males, ten black
males, two black females and four black
children) and settled on lands previously
scouted on April 16, 1842. The colony was
supplied with ten muskets, twenty musket

flints and two hundred "Ball Buckshot &
Cartridges." In reporting on the arrival of the
colony, General William Worth commented:
"the land is of Superior quality & from the
character of the Gentlemen concerned, there
is certainty of success."1
The success of the Manatee colony was
further assured by the arrival of other, some
prominent, men from Middle Florida. They
brought with them money, influence,
connections to the political elite and some
business acumen that many of Reid’s settlers
did not have. The names of the Bradens,
Gamble and others ring back the notable
figures of early Manatee. As Janet Snyder
Matthews has accurately recorded, this era
also brought H. V. Snell, William Whitaker
and Manuel Olivella into the land of historic
Manatee County. This leadership core,
including Reid, meant that the area was
blessed with men of wisdom and
connections which would allow the area to
grow and prosper, even in the face of
renewed Indian danger.2
The end of the Second Seminole War did
not, however, bring peace to the Florida
frontier. The tensions between the U.S.
Army, some of the settlers and the Indians
remained to incite many plans, plots and acts
of violence. Accounts of Indian-related
violence appeared frequently in the
newspapers of the young territory. On June
13, 1843, for example, the Tallahassee
Sentinel reported that in Alachua County:
"Another Indian Outrage . . . We are all in
arms again on account of the Indians."
Wrote a correspondent from Newnansville,
"On Monday, two Indians entered the house
of Mr. Gideon Hague, situated near San

Felasco Hammock, and, attacking his wife,
left her for dead. Herself, child and a small
negro girl were the only persons at home.
The girl escaped with the child and gave the
alarm to the family of Reuben Hague,
residing about a half mile distant . . . "3 An
attack that far north of the Manatee
settlement, in an area supposedly safe from
harm and devoid of Indians, increased the
feeling of vulnerability for everyone on the
frontier. Further afield, early the next year,
on the waters of the Choctawhatchee Bay in
the Florida Panhandle, the reports of further
Indian massacres could not have set well
with those concerned with the security of the
exposed settlements further south.4
The policy of the Federal Government at
this time did not sit well with the settlers,
who had hoped that the Army would finish
the job of removing the last of Florida’s
native population. In July of 1843, General
William Worth, commanding in Florida,
wrote the following to Major Wright, then
commanding at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay:
The Indians in Florida are permitted to
reside temporarily in that portion of the
Territory included within the red lines
represented on the Map herewith
furnished, where they are to remain and
not to leave, except to visit this Post for
the purpose of trading or other business.
They are to keep at peace with the
whites, and for depredations which may
be done them by the whites, they are to
complain here, where justice is to be
done them; for depredations to them on
the whites, their chief is to notice it by
promptly punishing those of his people
concerned . . . . There are but few
Indians in the Territory and it is the
desire of the Government, as soon as it
can be done without the risk of renewing
difficulties, to remove them West. To
this they are greatly opposed and are

suspicious of our wish to entrap them
and force their removal. As long as they
are suspicious, it will be difficult to carry
out the wishes of the Government, but
their suspicion may be gradually
removed by constantly observing
towards them an apparent indifference,
making them no presents, asking few
questions, respecting their people, never
persuading them to visit here, and
permitting them to purchase of the trader
whatever they may wish and can pay
cash for, including powder and whiskey
for which written orders are given . . . A
trader is appointed who is required to
keep on hand all articles usually wanted
by the Indians, to purchase their skins, to
sell at reasonable prices and in all
respects to deal fairly and honestly with
them; the Commanding Officer will
have to look to this matter frequently . . .
In order to verify our information as to
the number of male Indians the
commander will keep a roll of all who
may present themselves; this must be
done without their observation as it may
excite suspicions . . .5
Thomas P. Kennedy was given many of the
normal articles of trade from the Disbursing
Agent, S. G. Capers, on August 10, 1843.
These articles of trade included 2,000
common "Sigars," 35 pounds of tobacco, 98
Indian shawls, 32 camp kettles, 210 yards of
calico, and numerous other articles, but,
noticeably lacking in this list are powder and
whiskey.6 The trade was to be carried on in
Tampa, however, this arrangement soon
became too risky for all parties and Kennedy
opened his store on Charlotte Harbor.
The Army also attempted to manipulate the
Indians in the selection of a leader. It was
thought that the old policy of divide and rule
would benefit the policy of removal of the
Indians to the west. Worth wrote to Colonel

William Belknap on December 13, 1843,
about his concerns with the policy, then
being followed by the Colonel: "I have some
doubts as to the policy of fermenting a
rivalry between Bowlegs & Assinwah for
the chieftancy; and simply because the one
or the other might seek the ascendancy by a
war movement - this doubt aside, a rupture
between them would be our gain . . . On all
these matters I can but thro out hints &
suggestions as every movement must be the
result of circumstances - where they indicate
a decided course and time permit send me an
extra express - on such occasions allow no
letters to be sent except those that are private
& official to my self or staff - thus only can
we keep our operations duly secret."7 The
policy was calculated to cause dissent and
diversion, thus making the opportunity for
the Army to deport the Indians west that
much easier. Divided, the Indian leadership
probably realized that the tribes stood little
chance of remaining in Florida, therefore, in
the long run, this policy did not work to the
advantage of the Army.
That settlers were moving into the southern
portion of the territory and, especially, into
the area of Charlotte Harbor was noted in a
report of a scouting expedition by
Lieutenant W. C. Browne. On May 24,
1844, Browne wrote that "La Costa Grande"
island was inhabited by five people trading
with Mobile and New Orleans, via the
schooner The Water Lilly, commanded by a
Captain Berry, whose three children also
lived with him on the island. A Captain
Dewey, a New Englander, lived at "White
Point" and near the head of Boca Grande, a
certain gentleman named "Dexler" and a
discharged soldier named Dunston lived by
fishing and trapping under a company
headed by Proceus, later a partner of John
Darling in Tampa. Browne also noted the
residence of Primo, described as a Spaniard,
who lived on Pine Island and that an

Irishman named MacKay and a citizen of
Tampa named Stacks lived on "Matallachee
Key" (Little Pine Island). He also noted that
Sanibel and Captiva both had old
settlements on them, but were unoccupied at
the time.8 It is obvious that when Kennedy
moved his store and trading post to the area,
he was not alone and may not have been the
only "trader" trading with the Indians.
(Note: There is no corresponding endnote 8
at the end of this essay)
Rumors of war soon, however, began to
rumble over the frontier of southwestern
Florida. On August 5, 1844, General Worth
wrote to his commander at Tampa, Captain
Montgomery, the following: "I desire you to
cause the enclosed communication to be
forwarded with the least avoidable delay to
Colonel Reid, by the Star, if at Tampa, and
not urgently employed - instruct the
messenger to await for Colonel Reid’s
answers if he be found at his residence . . . I
have further to desire that Mr. Kennedy, the
Trader, and the Deputy Marshall, Mr. Ferris,
may be sent to the residence of each settler
on the Alafia, Simmons Hammock,
Thlonotossassa, indeed all in the vicinity
with a view to information on the following
points . . . Have you in any instance been
molested in person or property or in any way
inconvenienced by the Indians since your
residence’? Have you entertained or had
good reason to entertain apprehension from
these people? On their way to Tampa to
trade, have they in any case been rude and
insulting - or otherwise?" Worth also wanted
information from Reid on the shape of the
colony in respects to crops and "prospects
generally."9 The reason for the urgent
dispatches was an attempt by supporters of
David Levy, then Delegate to Congress, to
stir up rumors of a renewed Indian war. As
Worth’s assistant, Captain John T. Sprague
wrote to Montgomery: "Should it be known

to citizens the object of this information was
to disparage infamous reports to renew the
war, fabricated by the Delegates friends, the
information sought would in many instances
be given with reluctance."10 On August 9,
1844, Ferris and Kennedy were requested to
perform their duty and ordered to return
their responses to Fort Brooke.11
Throughout the remainder of 1844 and into
1845, the Army was busy putting down the
rumors of war and trying to regulate trade
with the Indians. Charlotte Harbor, close to
the boundary of Indian territory, was an area
of special concern because of the settlers
and traders reported by Lieutenant Browne.
There was even an attempt by the Territorial
government to set up a customs office at that
location, but this was opposed by General
Worth and others.12 They were very
concerned with removing the "intruders"
who were already doing an illegal business
in the vicinity.13 It comes as no surprise that
the Army encouraged and provided for the
moving of Kennedy’s store to Charlotte
Harbor in early 1845. As Worth noted to
Belknap: " . . . urge [upon the Indians] the
advantage of a trading establishment on the
waters of Charlotte Harbor & distinctly to
understand that no trading can be allowed
except by the regular trader we shall send
there; that if any other whites go there, we
shall send soldiers to remove them, the
whites."14
March 3, 1845, Florida was admitted to the
Union as an equal state, and with it, new
political forces arose to cause renewed
friction between the three groups. The
power of statehood which added two
Senators and a member of Congress
increased Florida’s political clout. This augmented the pressures now being exerted by
civilian authorities to get the Indian
population removed. Florida’s first governor,
William Moseley, was in constant

correspondence with the Army officers in
Florida and Washington during his years in
that post. Writing, for example, to Captain
John T. Sprague in St. Augustine, the
governor stated: "I feel myself constrained
to add that I am fearful the policy of the
Government
set
forth
in
your
communication will ultimately prove
unsuccessful."15 Such was the tenor of the
official correspondence coming from the
new office of Governor of the State of
Florida.
The year 1845 also saw, again, renewed
efforts by certain, unnamed individuals to
spread the rumors of Indian troubles. Again,
Worth wrote to Belknap; "The Indian story
which you refer to & which I suppose you
saw in the News was known to be false in
every particular. Colo. Washing’n the
Surveyor has just returned & denies every
syllable of it - a drunken scoundrel of his
party had come in and, as previously
directed brought an ‘Indian Story.’ What a
set of villains!"16 In one of the more telling
letters of the Belknap correspondence,
Worth let his feelings show to the fullest:
"The St. Augustine News which I seen or
read & have sworn I never will: but I am
told it contains two most scurrilous &
abusive articles or letters from Tampa of
yourself & command. You have traitors in
yr camp. I suspect the man Brown Kennedy’s partner from the language quoted
to me - as for instance ‘my wharf &’ the
other Brown in my opinion or perhaps
Byrne would not hesitate to do the same
thing. It is known indeed avowed this News
was bought up when Levy was here for the
express purpose of attacking the Mily."17
Indeed, the commanding general of the U.S.
Army in Florida was accusing the Senator
from the state of fomenting the constant
attacks on the military by the local press; no
clearer picture of the distrust between the

political and military personnel in Florida
could be drawn than that just quoted.
The boundary set up to separate the Indians
and whites was to be a twenty mile zone
around the area designated as Indian
Territory. Although the occupation of this
area was to be of short term, no one knew
exactly when the Indians would be ready to
emigrate to the west. Roughly this area
included much of the lower Peace River
Valley over to the Kissimmee River and
down it to Lake Okeechobee. At no point
was there to be any territory recognized as
Indian which had direct access to the ocean.
The old fear of rearmament from Cuba or
the Bahamas remained strongly embedded
in the military and civilian mind.
Interestingly, General Worth, upon seeing
the area on a map from the Surveyor
General of Florida, Valentine Conway,
immediately expressed his displeasure with
it, as it encompassed some lands already
surveyed and settled upon by whites.
Conway wrote to Washington for additional
instructions and the corrected line was
delineated on a new map.18
But the problems still remained for the
Army in patrolling the area and keeping the
whites and Indians apart. The Indians, by
almost all accounts, intended to remain
peaceful and caused little trouble. John T.
Sprague wrote to Captain .John H. Winder,
commanding at Fort Brooke, on January 10,
1846, that this was, indeed, the total intent
of Bowlegs and his followers which he had
learned at a meeting at Kennedy’s Charlotte
Harbor store.19 Just two days after penning
the above letter, Sprague again wrote to
Winder, this time complaining of "intruders"
with the Indians along the southwest coast.
He
claimed
these
intruders
were
"adventurers and speculators" who were idle
and profligate and who were manufacturing
"Indian signs" in hopes of exciting a new

war, in the name of personal profit.20
Keeping the "idle and profligate" from the
Indian territory remained a major problem
until the final outbreak of the Third
Seminole War in 1855.
That problems loomed with the civil
authorities was behind much of the
correspondence of 1846. Governor Moseley
was in almost constant touch with Captain
Aaron Jernigan who led the militia units in
the area south of Fort Gatlin, in central
Florida. From the correspondence between
these two, it is obvious that the Indians were
mistrusted and constantly "spied" upon and
that the Government, represented in Florida
by the Army, was viewed as weak regarding
removal. On February 24, the Governor
thanked
Captain
Sprague
for
his
reassurances, "that no act of hostility need
be apprehended from the Indians." However,
he did not believe that the situation would
remain so for long and noted that every
incident reported would be followed up by
Captain Jernigan or some other "responsible
person."21 On the same day, he also wrote to
Jernigan in a much stronger tone. "It is, I
assure you Sir, a matter of deep regret to me;
that these savages have not long since been
removed west of the Mississippi. I am quite
inclined to the opinion; per the information
from Capt. Sprague; that no hostile attacks
from them may be expected, nevertheless
their residence among us, is well calculated
to keep alive passions & prejudices which
would doubtless long since have subsided,
had they have been removed."22 These
pieces of the general correspondence
indicate that the State’s governor and his
associates did not consider the policy
advocated publicly by the Army as adequate
to the situation.
After
constant
reports
of
Indian
depredations, various attacks on wagon
masters, mail riders, etc., the general state of

affairs continued to decline. Indians, it was
reported, who had camped on Lake
Istokpoga (Highlands County) had badly
mistreated the negro of a Mr. Hancock.23
Senator James D. Westcott of Florida wrote
to President James K. Polk insisting that
Captain Sprague had underestimated the size
of the Seminole population greatly and that
they were more powerful than the Army was
willing to admit.24 Sprague, himself, was
doubting the trustworthiness of the
Seminoles and wrote to William Medill of
the Department of Indian Affairs that they
were, "more subtle, or vindictive, and
inimical to the whites," than any other tribe
in the United States.25 Trader John Darling,
soon to enter into a partnership with Thomas
Kennedy, wrote from the Charlotte Harbor
store: "I have been some time at this station
as agent for the Seminole Trader trading
with the Indians, and I have seen enough of
them to induce me to think that the policy at
present pursued by the General Government,
if the purpose is removal, ought to be
changed." He then continues and directly
attacks Captain John Casey: "The Indians
are now permitted and encouraged to go out
of the Reservation for the purpose of trade,
ostensibly, but in reality to enable the
Seminole Agent to keep up a quasi
communication with them without personal
inconvenience to himself. You are aware
that the present Agent is an officer in the
United States Army, and in command of
troops
at
Fort
Brooke."26
These
representative reports and observations
continued to fan the flames of possible war
on the Florida frontier, and the motives of
those involved did not appear pure and
devoid of personal interest.27
The great Indian Scare of 1849 brought out
more intense passions and tensions on the
Florida frontier. The murders on Indian
River and at Paynes Creek heightened the
call for renewed warfare against the

Seminoles and Miccosukees. The scare
depopulated the Indian River settlements,
the New River Settlement and much of that
originally found on the Miami River. In a
word, it nearly depopulated southeastern
Florida and made the impact of the Armed
Occupation Act nearly void in that region.28
The impact on the Sarasota-Manatee area
was also devastating at first. As Janet
Snyder Matthews has written, the
settlements were in a panic and a meeting
was called to discuss the matter and decide
on the appropriate course of action.
Volunteer units were called up by the
Governor and H. V. Snell, and Joseph
Woodruff, of Sarasota Bay, signed up to
serve under Manatee merchant, Henry S.
Clark, although this unit was not officially
mustered into service. Unfortunately, the
Army sent a Lieutenant J. Gibbon to
reassure the settlers that all was well. His
men, however, appeared at the Manatee
settlements on "ordinary draft mules" and
presented anything but a quick response unit
capable of delaying or destroying attacking
Indians.29 Captain John C. Casey, in writing
to Adjutant General R. Jones, noted that his
guides had found the usual signal for a peace
parlance, a white flag made of feathers and
tobacco with white beads, left by the Indians
on an elevated point on Sarasota Bay.30 His
commanding officer, Brevet Major General
D. E. Twiggs, an old veteran of the Indian
Wars, wrote on August 27, 1849:
Some days previous to my arrival a
white flag was found at Sarasota, as has
already been reported to the department
by Captain Casey. Yesterday I sent a
company to the Manitu river. On
reaching the district bordering on the
river, from which the inhabitants fled,
two white flags were found at Mr.
Addison’s, at the head of the river, and
signs of the tracks of two ponies.

Nothing had been injured on the
premises, and nothing but a few pounds
of flour taken from the house;
indications from which something
favorable may be hoped, in the expected
meeting of Captain Casey and the
chiefs.31
This revealing passage indicates that the
settlers on the Manatee had, like most others
in the exposed positions, left for the safety
of the nearest fortifications. Indeed, as early
as July 25, 1849, just four days after the
Payne’s Creek murders, Casey noted in his
diary, "people forting."32
By September 6, 1849, Casey was reporting
to his superior officer, Major W. W.
Mackall, that he had heard from Bowlegs
and that the latter regretted the recent
murders and that every effort would be
made by the tribe to bring the guilty parties,
whom were identified as five young
Seminoles from the Kissimmee River area,
to justice as soon as possible. Casey also
noted that Sam Jones had contacted Bowlegs
urging him to take the lead in keeping the
peace with the whites. Casey then reported
the good news, that the guilty parties had
been overtaken on their way to the
settlements by Chitto Hajo. The Captain
stated: "The chiefs all disavow and regret
these murders; and all the Indians are averse
to hostilities. They are satisfied with their
country, and with the treaty under which
they are living; and they now earnestly
desire to do justice in this matter." Broken
sticks were exchanged at the end of the
September 18-19th conference and peace
soon prevailed again on the frontier.33
Casey’s efforts to meet with Bowlegs and
resolve the problems met with great success
and at no time did he bring up the question
of removal. Yet, he was deeply troubled by
the knowledge that General David Twiggs
would bring up emigration at the next

conference, calling this an, "apparent breach
of faith."34
In his remarkable letters from the Florida
frontier, Brevet-Major John C. Pemberton
reported that the subject of removal was
brought up with Bowlegs at the next
conference. Twiggs traveled to Charlotte
Harbor in mid-October to personally receive
the prisoners who had perpetrated the
murders on Indian River and Payne’s Creek.
He took into custody three live prisoners, the
hand of another (killed while attempting to
escape) and a promise to capture the fifth
culprit. After securing the prisoners, Twiggs
brought up the eminent emigration, to which
the Indians "expressed great surprise &
showed great sorrow." Having just
demonstrated their desire and faithfulness to
the cause of peace, this reaction is
understandable. Pemberton struck the final
note by observing that the remainder would
now resist any attempt at removal and
predicted a "long and wearisome war"
before they would finally capitulate.35
The reports of violence on the frontier
continued, however, to flow back to the
Governor, now Thomas Brown. One of the
typical letters read like the following:
Sir, rumors say the Indian hostilities has
been recommenced. Six waggons or
teamsters has been Killed on Rout from
Fort Mellon to Fort Frazer on the
Kissimmee the truth I cant vouch for but
I fear it is tru for the Indians has not met
Gen Twiggs. Sir I merely request that
you would commission me and Lieut
William Kendrick Lieut Horn has left
the Dist.36
Indeed, the frequent reports of violence to
teamsters, mail riders, etc., lead one to
wonder about the political machinations
going on along the frontier, especially when

the rewards were a captaincy or some other
officer’s rank in the local militia. Some, like
John Darling, actually were reported to have
attempted to thwart negotiations, but were
stopped by cooler heads.37

Florida, and without which, I could not
advise the President to muster them in the
Service of the United States." This letter
effectively ended the hope at that time of
raising the troops for the final push.40

The immediate result of the Indian Scare of
1849, was the establishment of a line of
fortifications, if they can be called such,
along the southern frontier. Camp Gamble
was occupied near the Gamble plantation on
the north side of the river and another unit
was stationed at Dr. Braden’s place on the
south side. Little was done from these
"posts" and the incidents of the earlier part
of the year were soon over and life went
ahead. In some instances, soldiers were
simply put up in local homes and
plantations, such as those reported by
Brevet-Major Pemberton. The Major’s wife
gave birth to a ten-pound baby girl just
shortly after leaving the house of a
"Presbyterian parson" whose house was the
last one of the Manatee River settlement.38
The panic, which had been complete at one
stage of the Scare, did not fade from the
memories of those who lived through it and
caution was now the watchword for
everyone.39

The outline of a plan by the Army for
securing the frontier settlements, of course,
had already been in the works. On October
3, 1849, this plan was sent to Washington by
General Twiggs. Again, the central role of
the Manatee settlements comes out clearly in
this document. "Preparatory to a movement
into the Indian country," Twiggs wrote, "I
would make every effort to secure the
frontier settlements against an eruption of
the savages. To do this, I should propose a
line of posts from the Manatee to the Indian
river, passing between Kissimmee on the
South and Cypress lake on the north. On this
line of 200 miles, posts of two companies
each, 10 miles apart, would be required,
making 40 companies. Also depots at
Miami, New and Indian rivers, St. John’s on
the east, Manatee, Charlotte Harbor and
Caloosahatchee, on the western side of the
peninsula. . ." Twiggs also noted that the
garrisons would comprise about thirteen
companies, including a mounted force of
300 men. He continued by detailing the type
of boats to be used in Florida’s shallow
creeks and rivers. The naval force, as used in
the last war, was not efficient enough and
would not be needed. Fighting the Indians of
Florida, who gave no pitched battles and
fled at the approach of every force, Twiggs
declared, "Your numbers, then, must make
up for his intelligence and fleetness."41 The
plan, it is clear, was similar to one
developed toward the end of the Second
Seminole War by General Worth.

The political leaders, although happy at the
end of the immediate crisis, wanted more
troops deployed, hoping to entice the final
battles that would lead to removal. In this
hope they were disappointed. On August 7,
1849, Secretary of War George Crawford,
wrote to the Governor, "I think that the force
which is in process of being placed on the
Southern Settlements of the Peninsula, will
be adequate to their full defense. That force,
when assembled, will, in numerical
Strength, be quadruple that of the Indians.
You propose to raise a force, which would
be greater than the entire force of the
Indians. I confess I do not see the propriety
or necessity of employing the volunteers of

Throughout the 1850s, until the outbreak of
the Third Seminole War in 1855, the
tensions continued to mount. A general
policy of continued pressure on the Indians

was fully implemented. The U.S. Deputy
Surveyors were ordered into the "neutral
ground" to lay out public lands as a signal to
the Indians that civilization, as the whites
knew it, would soon be encroaching on their
land.42 The Army continuously sent in
reconnaissance missions (called surveys by
some) to map out the hiding places and
growing fields of the Indians. Lieutenant
Hartsuff was on one such mission when his
troops were attacked, beginning the last of
the Seminole Wars. The State legislature
regularly passed bills prohibiting trade with
the Indians and resolutions calling for
immediate removal. The Third Seminole
War was no accident. It was a fully
contrived exercise of continual pressure to
force the final issue of removal. Few on the
South Florida frontier were surprised when
the war finally did come; most, it may be
assumed, were relieved.
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